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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 14-3591 
____________ 
 
TIMOTHY E. STOUGH, 
 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 CONDUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-12-cv-02545) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 29, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 19, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Timothy Stough appeals the District Court’s summary judgment rejecting his 
claims of disability discrimination. We will affirm. 
I 
 In 2007, Stough informed his employer, Conductive Technologies, Inc., that he 
had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. In September 2009, Conductive learned 
that Stough had been having an affair with one of his subordinates. Stough received a 
written warning, a 10-day suspension, an order to cease contact with the employee in 
question, and a transfer to a nonsupervisory position. In April 2011, Conductive created a 
new executive position and filled it with an internal candidate. Conductive’s president, 
Matthew Musho, stated that Stough was never considered for the position because his 
affair exhibited “a lack of judgment” and he “lacked the technological skills necessary” 
to do the job. App. 103–04. In March 2012, Stough filed a charge against Conductive 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that he had been 
discriminated against on the basis of his Parkinson’s disease.  
 After the EEOC notified him of his right to sue, Stough sued Conductive in the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Alleging violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Stough claimed that he had been demoted, passed over 
for a promotion, harassed, and subjected to unfair performance evaluations because of his 
disability. Fact discovery began in August 2013, with a deadline of February 27, 2014. At 
about 3:30 p.m. on February 27, Stough filed a motion for an extension of time to 
complete discovery, which the District Court denied. After Conductive moved for 
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summary judgment in March 2014, Stough filed a motion for permission to conduct 
additional discovery in order to respond adequately to Conductive’s motion. The District 
Court denied Stough’s motion and granted Conductive summary judgment, holding that 
Stough’s demotion and failure to promote claims were time-barred and that his hostile 
work environment claim failed as a matter of law. Stough v. Conductive Techs., Inc., 
2014 WL 3421069 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2014). Stough filed this timely appeal.1  
II 
 “The conduct of discovery is a matter for the discretion of the district court and its 
decisions will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of this discretion.” 
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Our review of 
summary judgments, on the other hand, is plenary, id. at 83, and summary judgment is 
appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
A 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) permits a litigant who “cannot present facts 
essential to justify its opposition” to a motion for summary judgment to request that the 
district court permit additional discovery. “We have interpreted this provision to require 
‘a party seeking further discovery in response to a summary judgment motion [to] submit 
an affidavit specifying, for example, what particular information is sought; how, if 
uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not previously been 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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obtained.’” Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 139–40 
(3d Cir. 1988)). 
 We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the materials 
submitted by Stough inadequate to warrant relief under Rule 56(d). Stough admitted that 
the first time he sought to conduct the requested discovery—depositions of six witnesses 
associated with Conductive—was on February 26, 2014, one day before the expiration of 
the time allotted for fact discovery. The next afternoon, just hours before the deadline, 
Stough requested an extension of time from the District Court. Counsel’s only 
explanation for this tardy effort is that “severe winter weather during February 2014” 
caused “considerable and unprecedented scheduling issues.” App. 364. But inclement 
weather during the last month of the discovery phase does not explain counsel’s failure to 
even initiate the scheduling process at any point during the previous six months. See 
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming the denial of a motion 
to delay summary judgment for additional discovery because the movants failed to 
sufficiently explain their lack of diligence). Because Stough did not support his Rule 
56(d) motion by adequately specifying why the discovery materials sought “ha[d] not 
previously been obtained,” the District Court did not err in denying his motion. Dowling, 
855 F.2d at 140. 
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B 
 With respect to the District Court’s summary judgment for Conductive, Stough 
claims the Court erred by holding that his demotion and failure to promote claims were 
untimely and that his hostile work environment claim fails as a matter of law. We 
disagree. 
 Before initiating an employment discrimination suit under the ADA, Stough was 
required to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 
12117(a). Stough filed his EEOC charge “[o]n or about March 12, 2012,” App. 27, 
meaning any claims accruing before May 17, 2011 were untimely. Stough’s alleged 
demotion took place in late 2009, and he was passed over for Conductive’s new 
executive position in April 2011. The District Court therefore correctly held that these 
claims were time-barred.2 
 Stough’s hostile work environment claim, meanwhile, fails on the merits. In his 
brief, Stough refers to several incidents he perceived as harassment and mistreatment. 
Stough Br. 7–11, 29–32. He alleges that a Conductive board member told him after he 
was disciplined for his workplace romance that his new position was “not so bad 
considering [his] condition and all and no decrease in salary,” App. 113; that he was 
                                                 
2 Stough argues that his claims were timely because his demotion and 
nonpromotion were parts of a “continuing violation.” Stough Br. 25–29 (citing Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)). We reject this argument because (1) 
Stough makes no meaningful effort to link these incidents to discriminatory treatment 
taking place within the relevant 300-day window, and (2) we have previously held, in 
interpreting Morgan, that demotion and failure to promote are “discrete acts” that “cannot 
be aggregated under a continuing violations theory.” O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 
F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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unfairly downgraded on a performance evaluation because of the affair; that Musho gave 
him a booklet on Parkinson’s disease around the time he was not promoted; that Musho, 
speaking privately with another Conductive executive, explained his decision not to 
promote Stough by stating, “[H]e’s got Parkinson’s,” App. 116; that he was reprimanded 
for missing a meeting; that Conductive’s human resources manager sent him a letter 
asking him to complete a questionnaire in order to receive additional medical leave; and 
that other Conductive employees spoke negatively about him in meetings. 
 We agree with the District Court that these allegations of mistreatment and the 
evidence Stough has adduced to support them are insufficient to avoid summary 
judgment. A prima facie hostile work environment claim requires, inter alia, that the 
claimant was subject to harassment on the basis of his disability and that “the harassment 
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and to 
create an abusive working environment[.]” Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 
F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999). Several of Stough’s allegations are irrelevant because they 
appear to be wholly unrelated to his disability (e.g., the assertions that he was harassed 
and unfairly evaluated on the basis of his affair, the reprimand for missing a meeting, and 
the negative chatter about him by other employees). See id. (“The fact that [the 
employer’s behavior] may have been offensive does not indicate that it was based on [the 
plaintiff’s] disability.”). Some allegations are insufficiently severe, even when aggregated 
with the others, to rise to the level of a hostile work environment (e.g., the board 
member’s alleged “not so bad” comment and the matter of the Parkinson’s disease 
booklet). Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“[O]ffhand 
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comments[] and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to 
discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”). And the 
remainder are duplicative of his time-barred demotion and failure to promote claims (e.g., 
the allegation that Musho nixed his promotion on the basis of his Parkinson’s diagnosis). 
Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to Stough, we cannot say a 
reasonable jury could rule in his favor on his hostile work environment claim. 
* * * 
 The judgment of the District Court will therefore be affirmed. 
